Fatoumatta: In 2016, Gambians did something the world did not expect. A fragmented opposition, long dismissed as weak and divided, forged a grand coalition that unseated a dictator who had ruled for 22 years. That coalition, painstakingly negotiated and morally anchored, was not a miracle; it was the product of political courage, strategic discipline, and a shared understanding that the alternative—another term of authoritarian rule—was intolerable.
Ten years later, as the country heads toward the 2026 presidential election, the opposition is once again talking about unity. But this time, the story is very different. The Alliance for Political Exchange (APeX) entered the scene with an ambitious mission: to midwife a broad opposition coalition capable of unseating President Adama Barrow in December 2026. Its stated goal echoed the spirit of 2016—bringing the parties together, negotiating a common platform, and rallying behind a single candidate. In theory, the conditions seemed ripe: growing public discontent, governance fatigue, and a sense that the promises of the post-Jammeh transition had been squandered.
In practice, APeX has struggled. Unlike the 2016 coalition—where Halifa Sallah and other opposition figures helped engineer a structured, time-bound alliance with a clear objective and a single flagbearer—APeX has not yet assembled a comparable front. Key parties, such as PDOIS, GDC, and the APRC’s non-alliance faction, remain outside its framework. Instead of a grand coalition, APeX has had to settle, at least for now, for something more modest: a “Harmony Pact” designed to manage hostility rather than consolidate power.
On 3 March 2026, six opposition parties and movements signed what is formally called the “Tri-vergence Accord,” a voluntary harmony pact convened under APeX’s auspices. The signatories are: All People’s Party Sobeyaa (Essa Mbye Faal), Gambia for All (Bakary Bunja Dabo), National Unity Party (Dr. Lamin J. Darbo), Tabax Rewmi Movement (Ahmadou Kah), the United Democratic Party (ANM Ousainou Darboe), and the Unite Movement for Change (Talib Ahmed Bensouda).
The accord is not a coalition agreement. It is a framework for “mutual respect, political harmony, and constructive engagement” among opposition actors engaged in ongoing coalition talks. It commits signatories to refrain from inflammatory rhetoric, incitement, false statements, and conduct likely to provoke violence or public disorder, while preserving space for debate and disagreement. It also establishes dialogue and mediation mechanisms to de-escalate tensions when they arise.
Symbolically, the name “Tri-vergence” is anchored in the convergence of three events on 18 February 2026: The Gambia’s Independence Day, the beginning of Ramadan, and the Christian season of Lent. Substantively, it is meant as a provisional safeguard for the integrity of the coalition-building process and a confidence-building measure among opposition stakeholders who have historically struggled to maintain unity. This is where the political analysis becomes unavoidable: APeX has not delivered a coalition. It has delivered a code of conduct.
APeX is not a political party but an independent civic platform, often referred to as the Alliance for Political Exchange. It positions itself as a neutral convener of opposition dialogue, aiming to facilitate rather than compete, and to broker rather than contest elections. However, the limitations of this role are now apparent.
First, APeX has not succeeded in bringing all major opposition groups together, either in discussion or under a unified banner. PDOIS, GDC, and the non-alliance APRC faction remain outside the Tri-vergence framework. Their absence is a significant structural weakness. Any coalition seeking to match the scope of 2016 must include these groups or compensate by consolidating the remaining opposition vote. Currently, neither has occurred.
Second, the Tri-vergence Accord is explicitly non-binding under the law. It is framed as a “solemn moral and political commitment,” but it does not compel any party to accept a single candidate, a joint manifesto, or a shared campaign structure. It is, in essence, a peace treaty among rivals, not a unification charter.
Third, the accord remains open-ended. Other parties and candidates may join by notifying APeX or any signatory. While this inclusivity is positive, it also highlights the project’s incomplete status. With the election set for 5 December 2026, time is limited.
APeX is best seen as a facilitator of “managed coexistence” among opposition groups, rather than as the architect of a unified electoral front. The comparison with 2016 remains both inevitable and instructive.
In 2016, the opposition’s grand coalition was forged under the shadow of a long-standing dictatorship. The stakes were existential. The coalition agreement was clear: a single candidate, a three-year transition promise (however, later contested), and a unified campaign against a regime that had exhausted its legitimacy. The moral clarity of that moment made compromise possible.
In 2026, the situation has changed. The incumbent is an elected president who came from the coalition that ended Jammeh’s rule. The opposition is now divided by competing ambitions, ideological differences, and unresolved issues from the post-2016 transition, rather than united by a single urgent threat.
APeX is operating in a more complex, more fragmented, and more cynical environment. That complexity does not absolve it of responsibility, but it explains why a 2016-style coalition has not materialized. The Tri-vergence Accord has two faces.
On one hand, the accord demonstrates political maturity. In a region where opposition politics often involves personal attacks, factionalism, and at times violence, a voluntary agreement to reduce hostility and avoid incitement is significant. It shows that the opposition’s conduct is a measure of its readiness to govern and acknowledges that coalition negotiations are delicate, with unmanaged rivalry threatening unity.
On the other hand, the accord also signals weakness. It is what parties sign when they cannot yet agree on leadership, a common program, or power-sharing. It serves as a prelude rather than a political breakthrough.
APeX’s shift from a “grand coalition” to a “harmony pact” indicates the opposition is still in the early stages of building trust. With less than a year until the election, this is a sobering reality.
Fatoumatta: As December 5 approaches, the key question is whether the Tri-vergence Accord will develop into a genuine coalition or remain a polite agreement to disagree. If it remains the latter, the opposition risks entering the 2026 election as a group of well-behaved rivals rather than a unified alternative. President Barrow, benefiting from incumbency, state resources, and a divided opposition, would then face little consolidated challenge.
However, if APeX can transform the accord into a binding coalition agreement—with a single candidate, clear platform, and disciplined campaign structure—it could still reshape the election. Achieving this requires three key steps:
Including or strategically accommodating currently absent groups such as PDOIS, GDC, and the non-alliance APRC faction; establishing a credible, transparent process for selecting a flagbearer that respects all key leaders; and developing a shared narrative that explains to Gambians both why Barrow should be replaced and what a post-Barrow Gambia would look like in practical terms.
Without these, the Tri-vergence Accord will be remembered as a well-written document that managed behavior but did not change outcomes. Gambians have seen this movie before, opposition parties talking unity in press conferences while quietly preparing separate campaigns. The difference in 2016 was that, for once, the script changed. Leaders subordinated their ego to necessity, and the people rewarded them.
APeX now faces a new test: not only of its convening power, but also of the opposition’s commitment. The Harmony Pact is a beginning, but it is insufficient. History will judge the opposition not by the civility of its disagreements in 2026, but by whether it presented Gambians with a credible, unified alternative when it mattered most.
Fatoumatta: As December 5 approaches, the question is no longer whether APeX can draft agreements, but whether it can help achieve what Gambians accomplished in 2016: a coalition that not only coexists, but wins.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect The Monitor’s editorial stance.
